Entry for October 06, 2007

as a celebration of returning of beautiful Sinai ..i read this study about Egyptian army during WAR of 6 october
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1997/Moulton.htm


The 1973 October War: The Egyptian Perspective



CSC 1997



Subject Area - History



/EXECUTIVE SUMMARY



Title: The 1973 October War: The Egyptian Perspective



Author: Major J.C. Moulton, United States Air Force



Problem Statement: Following the conclusion of the 1967 Six Day War with Israel Egypt was forced to completely re-evaluate its strategic and operational objectives and capabilities. Egypt suffered the loss of over 80 percent of its military capability and was forced to concede control of both the Sinai peninsula and the Suez Canal. Israel also gained control of Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights. Entering the fall of 1973 Egypt's strategic position appeared extremely tenuous. The Egyptian President, Anwar Sadat, had failed to achieve the strategic goals of the Arab coalition and his leadership within the Arab world was threatened. Further, the demands of the 1967 Khartoum Conference appeared to eliminate any alternative course of action. The Egyptian leadership faced the dilemma of how to break the deadlock in which it was entangled with Israel without alienating itself from the Arab mainstream. President Sadat, under intense pressure both internally and throughout the Middle East, had to construct a strategic plan in order to engage Israel and recoup the losses of 1967...and survive (politically and literally) long enough to witness the results.



Background. This paper will analyze the changes which the Egyptian leadership made prior to the 1973 October War which enabled it to emerge as the strategic victor. President Anwar Sadat undertook a course which would either place Egypt and Israel on the road to peace or end his career...and probably his life.





Conclusion: There are several important points to consider:

1. First, the value of constructive analysis. Egypt critically examined the reasons for the

1967 loss, while Israel failed to properly determine all of the reasons for its success. Egypt then corrected its mistakes and planned accordingly.

2. The 1973 War demonstrates the value of properly coordinating military capabilities and national objectives. Egypt tailored its desires in order to fall within the grasp of its own military capabilities. It abandoned its unrealistic "total" war outlook (privately) in exchange for a sensible, attainable "limited" approach.

3. The potential for "shaping" the assumptions and stereotypes of an enemy. Egypt completely fooled the Israelis-a major achievement.



In conclusion, the Egyptian approach to the 1973 October War represents an outstanding case study for any student of military history.